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This issue is focused on China. The focus is partly an opportunity to peer into the rising importance of China from a development 
studies perspective, but it also marks the rising importance of research on China within the Institute of Social Studies and the initiation 
of a staff research cluster for this purpose, appropriately called ‘Focus on China’ (see the description of this cluster on page 11). 
In standing with the ISS tradition of engaging with the big questions about development, a variety of leading scholars working 
on China, both inside and outside China, were asked to reflect on the following question from the perspective of their own long 
standing expertise on the country: does the example of the People’s Republic of China over the last 30 years present a new model of 
development to the world? Or does it reconfirm some of the classical insights from development studies? 
This question refers both to the growth success of China and to the perversions of this success, for example, rising inequalities. In a 
sense, China brings us back to development debates that were raging during the 1960s and 1970s, before the 1982 debt crisis and 
subsequent programmes of structural adjustment pulled research agendas away from questions of ‘growth with equity’ and towards 
questions of no growth at all. Up to the 1970s, while China was still under the autarky of Maoism, regions such as Latin America were 
experiencing decently rapid rates of growth, with Brazil hailed as a growth miracle. However, critics from the political and academic left 
were pointing to the economic and social polarisation and marginalisation that were accompanying such growth, at the same time as 
neoliberal scholars were impassioned with the cause of dismantling import-substitution industrialisation and state interventionism. In 
the end, the economic models producing both growth and marginalisation unravelled and were razed. 
In the meantime, China has now arisen from the shadows of Maoism as the new growth miracle among large poor countries, charting 
a new path for those disillusioned (or never illusioned) with the remedies of the dominant international financial institutions. Therefore, 
in a certain sense, we have returned to the same concerns of the 1960s. China and several other large poor countries such as India 
have kept the issues of investment, production and national capital accumulation on their agendas, setting them off from the reigning 
development discourse. Their successes in generating sustained growth are now a reality to contend with and have resurrected issues 
of equity within growth (versus equity within stabilisation and structural adjustment).
In setting this broad frame of reference for the invited scholars, the response was diverse and fascinating. The articles alternate 
between scholars based in the West and Chinese scholars based in China. The first opens with a reflection on the Chinese model 
by Sarah Cook from IDS in the UK, followed by an interview with Zhu Ling, a leading economist in China. Athar Hussain from LSE in 
the UK discusses the challenges of current social security reforms, while Xizhe Peng, one of China’s leading demographers, offers an 
update on demographic developments. Laurence Roulleau-Berger, a leading French sociologist working on China, writes about new 
forms of social and economic inequality. Rong Ma, a leading sociologist in China working on minority issues, writes about the history of 
‘nationality policy’ in China. This is followed by an article from Max Spoor from ISS on a current ISS research project in Western China; 
an article on Chinese NGOs by Lu Yiyi, a Chinese research fellow at the University of Nottingham in the UK; and finally, an article on 
participation in the Chinese context by Lu Caizhen, a Chinese PhD graduate at ISS. 
While space limited the inclusion of yet more debates and insights, we hope that this 
selection whets the appetite of the reader and encourages them to seek out further China-
related engagements with the ISS. Or, to paraphrase the closing remarks by Zhu Ling from 
her interview in this issue, while China’s development is a difficult process, it also offers 
many very exciting facets to challenge current thinking in the field of development studies. 
It is our hope that ISS becomes one of the leaders to take up this challenge, as it has in so 
many other development issues over the years. 
Andrew Fischer, ISS lecturer and guest editor. Andrew can be contacted at fischer@iss.nl 
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the international market’. The photo 
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during his fieldwork in this area.
About the cover
The views expressed in DevISSues are those of the original 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.
4 
China’s development model: 
What is there to learn?
Sarah Cook
The 30th anniversary of China’s reform 
has been a catalyst for reflection on 
China’s development experience. 
The global financial dislocation has 
heightened this interest. Among the 
international development community, 
questions are being asked about 
the significance of China’s rise for 
low income countries, for poverty 
reduction and the delivery of global 
public goods. There is much to learn 
from China’s experience, but a unique 
combination of features makes the 
search for a ‘model’ or for lessons to 
extrapolate an elusive one. China’s rise 
also brings a major challenge to the 
traditional development community 
which needs to understand China’s 
motivations, rooted as they are in its 
domestic development strategy; and 
to adapt to China’s presence in low 
income economies and the alternative 
development paths it offers. 
Is there a ‘ChIna model’?
How should we attempt to understand 
China’s particular combination of 
authoritarian socialist politics and 
increasingly market-based forms of 
economic organisation which have 
accompanied rapid growth? There is 
no easily identifiable ‘model’ which 
captures China’s reform experience. 
To the extent that a model can be 
described, it concerns process rather 
than blueprint or policy prescription. It 
is one of pragmatism, experimentation 
and gradualism; looking for successes, 
keeping what works and discarding what 
does not. This approach is reflected in 
widely-cited slogans – ‘Seek truth from 
facts’, ‘Crossing the river by feeling the 
stones’ and Deng Xiaoping’s comments 
about the colour of the cat being 
unimportant as long as it catches mice. 
What China has achieved was 
unimaginable thirty years ago, even to 
the architects of reform. Throughout 
this period, the leadership has pursued 
a trilogy of objectives – reform and 
opening, development, and stability, 
with stability remaining at the core, the 
key determinant of the sequence and 
speed of reforms – when to push ahead 
and when to retreat. The Party-state 
leadership has shown a responsiveness 
to innovations that work, allowing space 
for variation in policy implementation 
suited to local conditions, moving ahead 
in small steps but stopping to evaluate 
and if necessary take a step back if Party 
control and stability are threatened. 
These processes are found in reforms 
starting with the decollectivisation of 
agriculture and establishment of Special 
Economic Zones, to the dismantling of 
state-owned enterprises, relaxations 
on labour mobility, expanding civil 
society and personal freedoms, and 
the reconstruction of a social welfare 
system more suited to a market 
economy. Policy interventions respond 
to specific problems at various points 
in the process.  Where threats of social 
or political instability are perceived, 
the leadership tightens central controls 
or reins back on reform – as for 
example in the response to the student 
demonstrations of 1989; in limiting 
the spread of direct elections beyond 
village level; and in the constraints 
placed on autonomous ‘civil society’ 
associations or other collective forms of 
organising or protest. 
Critical to China’s reform has been 
the building of new institutions or 
the flexible adaptation of old ones to 
meet changing economic and social 
realities. At key moments, institutional 
bottlenecks have arisen, for example 
the absence of clearly defined property 
rights, an independent legal system, 
access to information, accountability 
mechanisms and regulatory structures. 
Many of these problems remain 
and may yet create fundamental 
challenges to the system. Policies 
and institutional arrangements that 
facilitated earlier stages of rapid 
growth may later become obstacles 
to further development. An element 
of ‘showcase’ modernity, aimed less 
at self-sustaining development than 
elite consumption patterns, has 
created high environmental costs and 
social inequalities which may be less 
easily resolved. To date, however, 
the government has intervened at 
key moments to avert the threat of 
instability. 
The current financial crisis creates a 
further opportunity to observe China’s 
development ‘model’ at work, to see 
whether potential crisis can be turned to 
opportunity. As growth slows well below 
the ‘magic’ eight per cent frequently 
Thirty years of sustained and rapid growth has brought China to the threshold of 
being a major player on the international stage. As new groupings (from G2 to G20 
and beyond) take shape during the current financial crisis, China’s size and new 
found influence inevitably place it at the heart of any emerging global leadership 
configuration. What does this mean for international development, and how will 
China contribute to meeting current global development challenges? What lessons, 
if any, can be drawn from China’s experience, and does it constitute a distinctive 
‘development model’? 
publicised as necessary to maintain 
social stability, the government faces 
pressures to restructure the economy, 
reduce export dependence, and 
stimulate domestic consumption while 
addressing widespread economic 
insecurity. The crisis may provide policy 
space to meet these dilemmas and 
potential domestic fractures, but the 
government must do so while also 
managing heightened international 
expectations that it can contribute to 
stabilising the global economy. 
What is distinctive in China’s 
reform process is therefore less an 
ideologically based set of policy 
prescriptions than a flexible process 
of adaptation to rapid change within 
specific political and institutional 
contexts. China needs to be 
understood not for its exceptionalism, 
although there are of course distinctive 
characteristics including its size and 
strong state capacity, but rather for the 
way it is managing the structural and 
demographic transformations that all 
countries experience, on a larger scale 
and at a faster speed than ever before. 
This has called for creativity and 
innovation in solving problems and 
responding to circumstances for which 
there is no blueprint. 
ChIna’s development model In 
ComparatIve perspeCtIve
To what extent do policies pursued 
by the Chinese state reflect other 
development experiences? China’s 
reforms are frequently assessed with 
reference to East Asia’s ‘developmental 
states’. While some similarities exist 
in the ability of authoritarian states 
to direct capital towards economic 
objectives, there have also been key 
differences (Tsai, K. and S. Cook, 2005). 
As a transitional economy, China faced 
the dual task of dismantling socialist 
institutions while constructing ones 
suited to market-oriented growth. Sub-
national governments in China have 
had greater autonomy in determining 
the terms of local development: 
its political system and sheer size 
complicate effective and consistent 
implementation of policies set forth at 
the centre. As a ‘late liberaliser’, China 
faced different global conditions from 
the East Asian ‘late industrialisers’: 
China’s rise has taken place in a 
global environment less conducive to 
negotiating development strategies 
and institutional reorganization in a 
purely domestic manner. The terms 
of its participation in economic 
institutions have been subject to more 
complex negotiations, and China 
has generally had less time than its 
East Asian neighbours to conform to 
multilateral trading norms.
Other debates have concerned the 
speed and sequencing of reforms – the 
benefits of ‘big bang’ versus gradualist 
approaches to transition. China’s 
gradualism was initially criticised by 
some observers for lost economic 
efficiency, but it enabled the leadership 
to maintain political control and 
stability and establish new institutional 
arrangements while ‘growing out of 
the plan’ (Naughton, B., 1996).
More recently – and of particular 
relevance for international 
development – are debates over 
whether China’s development 
approach, including its interactions 
with other low income countries, 
challenges the orthodoxy of the 
Bretton Woods institutions. While 
the basic tenets of the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ are increasingly 
questioned, and policy prescriptions 
have already shifted significantly, 
even less agreement is found around 
the so-called Beijing Consensus. 
From the perspective of developing 
economies, China may represent an 
alternative approach, distinct from 
OECD development orthodoxies 
and aid modalities. With its emphasis 
on partnership and mutual interest, 
China’s engagement as trade partner, 
investor or producer has been an 
important driver of growth, apparent 
particularly in its rapid expansion of 
economic activity in Africa. Beyond 
some general guiding principles, such 
as non-interference in internal affairs of 
other nations, however, there are few 
clearly identifiable policy prescriptions 
for China’s development assistance. 
A migrant labourer rides a rickshaw through a construction site on the European themed Thames Town 
housing development, Songjiang District, Shanghai / Qilai Shen, Panos Pictures
“What China has 
achieved was 
unimaginable thirty 
years ago”
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What does ChIna’s rIse 
mean for InternatIonal 
development?
China’s impact is significant both for 
other developing countries and the 
international development community. 
For the former, the process and 
pragmatism of China’s experience, 
grounded in local realities, offers 
insights but does not necessarily 
provide specific guidance for countries 
with very different governance 
systems, resource endowments, 
policy processes and implementation 
capacities. China seeks to secure its 
own long term economic and political 
interests, particularly in energy and 
resource security, with its development 
assistance closely tied to trade and 
investment. This has led for example 
to much needed infrastructure projects 
in countries where the international 
development community has under-
invested or withdrawn, and where 
private sector returns are unattractive. 
Western donors may need to revisit 
this missing infrastructure link in 
development, as well as reconsidering 
the nature of conditionalities which 
recipient countries may avoid if 
China offers an alternative source of 
assistance.
At a micro level, China may have 
concrete lessons to offer developing 
countries from its own interventions 
to reduce poverty, guarantee food 
security or basic health and education, 
or in the provision of infrastructure and 
technologies. The challenge facing both 
China and prospective beneficiaries 
is what and how to learn. Chinese 
researchers, or scholars of China, are 
best placed to assemble that knowledge 
in a rigorous way, but need partnerships 
to share it effectively. The external 
demand for ‘lessons from China’ for 
other countries is increasing, but there 
are few mechanisms linking the supply 
and demand for such information. 
Effective mechanisms need to be 
created for dialogue between those 
trying to find solutions to particular 
problems in a specific context and those 
who can understand and analyse the 
Chinese experience. The creation of a 
‘development infrastructure’ within the 
Chinese bureaucracy may be one step 
to facilitate this process; strengthening 
collaborative research, and bringing 
Chinese scholars into development 
research consortia, is another.
For the wider development community, 
China offers new approaches as well 
as fundamental challenges to its mode 
of operating. China’s engagement in 
low income countries will upset how 
development assistance is delivered, 
and may push the development 
field further and faster towards a re-
evaluation of aid modalities. It provides 
an opportunity for serious reflection on 
the western development model and 
what it has achieved at a time when 
boundaries are shifting rapidly and new 
relationships and groupings (north-
south, emerging economies, ‘BRICs’*) 
being sought. It offers an opportunity 
to move from approaches based on 
donor-recipient relations to those of 
partnership and mutual interest. 
Among development researchers 
and practitioners, however, there is 
limited understanding of what drives 
China – its domestic priorities and 
motivations. While many bilateral and 
multilateral development agencies 
have operated in China for over 20 
years, until recently there has been little 
effort to link development experiences 
within China to activities elsewhere. 
As China takes on a more prominent 
role as a development actor, there is a 
growing need to understand China’s 
motivations and interests, its domestic 
policies and pressures, and how these 
shape its activities globally. An account 
of China’s own ‘discourse’ around 
development, how policies are made 
and different agendas pursued, and 
which western development ideas are 
adopted and adapted in China’s own 
development plans would provide a 
valuable perspective to inform western 
development debates, while helping 
to build mutual understanding of 
respective approaches. 
China is also being called on to play 
a major role in contributing to global 
public goods that are particularly 
relevant for the developing world. 
It has become a key player in major 
changes in the global order, perhaps 
sooner than it would have liked. It is 
playing an increasingly influential role 
in setting international norms that 
affect developed and developing 
countries, and in the development of 
new institutions of governance relating 
for example to trade, climate, financial 
flows and security. In participating in 
the international system, China is for 
the most part being asked (and making 
efforts) to adapt to a set of institutions 
and priorities developed by other 
powers. This role brings risk and a 
perception of threat from many in the 
west, as well as opportunities, potential 
benefit and greater responsibility.
The financial crisis may leave China as 
a development partner of choice with 
increasing ‘soft power’ influence in the 
developing world. The development 
community should take this opportunity 
to understand China’s strategic interests 
and motivations in order to enhance 
collaboration in the goals of renewed 
but sustainable growth and poverty 
reduction. Achieving this will require a 
multilateral response and the creation 
of a more inclusive framework for 
dialogue and cooperation on global 
development issues. 
This paper draws on presentations and discussions 
at a number of workshops on China’s development  
including: ‘Researching China’s Development: 
What does ‘Development Studies’ have to offer 
China and what can it learn from China?’ presented 
at  the Symposium on Livelihoods, Mobility and 
Development: the Chinese Experience, NICS, 
Leeds, November 30th, 2007; presentation 
at the workshop ‘Does the Growth of China 
challenge everything we thought we knew about 
development’ Manchester University, 25th April, 
2008,  and IDS-Brookings workshop on ‘China 
and Financial Crisis: Implications for low incomes 
countries’ Tsinghua University, 20th March, 2009.
Sarah Cook is a Research Fellow at the Institute 
of Development Studies, University of Sussex, UK. 
She received her PhD from Harvard University. 
She currently directs a multi-country research 
programme on ‘Social Protection in Asia’, and 
is involved in comparative research on informal 
employment in China and India. 
“China’s impact is 
significant both for 
other developing 
countries...”
AF. China recently reported an annual 
GDP growth rate of 6.8 per cent for 
2008. Some commentators suggest 
that this means the economy did not 
grow at all in the last quarter of 2008, 
which could be quite dramatic given 
that the government has consistently 
suggested that a growth rate of 8 per 
cent is necessary in order to maintain 
stability. How do you think China is 
handling the current global economic 
crisis and what challenges lie ahead in 
order for it to maintain its recent past 
performance?
ZL. The responses of the Chinese 
government to the global economic 
crisis are on the right track, such 
as expanding public investment in 
infrastructural programmes, investing 
in social protection programmes, or 
promoting job creation for unemployed 
rural migrant workers and newly 
graduated college students. 
The most serious challenge lies in 
the last point; how to create as many 
jobs as possible through domestic 
sources of economic growth and in a 
labour-intensive way, given that the 
export sector, which was one of the 
main drivers of growth until recently 
(investment was the other), has 
been seriously affected by the global 
economic crisis.
AF. Regarding your second point, 
it has been often noted by many 
economists that Chinese economic 
growth since the 1990s has had a low 
elasticity of employment to growth, in 
contrast to earlier periods which were 
much more labour intensive. This is 
precisely the reason why high growth 
rates are deemed necessary, so that 
sufficient jobs can be generated 
given these characteristics of growth. 
Therefore, what you suggest implies 
a radical reorientation from the path 
of the Chinese growth model over 
the last two decades, would it not? 
How could the government bring this 
about?
ZL. Prior to the current reform period 
the growth model was actually much 
less labour intensive in comparison 
with the reform period from the early 
1980s onwards. This can be seen from 
the fact that more than 80 per cent 
of the labour force was squeezed in 
the agricultural sector. In the first half 
of the 1980s the major driving force 
of growth was agricultural and rural 
non-agricultural development, which 
were characteristically labour intensive. 
This was because the increase of 
employment and household income was 
given priority during that period, after 
the economic crisis that occurred in the 
period of the ‘Cultural Revolution’. Since 
the 1990s, when the Chinese economy 
became more involved in globalisation 
and the growth rate was used as a key 
indictor to evaluate the achievements 
of local officials, the growth model has 
tended to be more export-oriented and 
capital intensive.
The current economic crisis has forced 
the Chinese government to design 
policies towards a more labour intensive 
and environmentally-friendly growth 
model. However, these efforts alone 
would not bring substantial changes 
without strengthening anti-monopoly 
policies and opening the monopolised 
sectors to the entry of the non-state 
owned enterprises, such as in petroleum 
production and marketing, the power 
industry, communications and banking. 
Furthermore, the labour intensive small 
and medium sized enterprises should 
be given better access to financial 
services and public support. In any 
case, employment should be taken as 
the most important indicator to evaluate 
local governments. That would help 
China’s economy and the global 
economic crisis: an interview 
with Zhu Ling 
by Andrew Fischer
 A job seeker in Chongqing / Zhu Ling
*  The large emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, 
India and China.
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to promote job creation as well as 
the build up of assets in the non-state 
sectors of the economy.   
AF: Hasn’t the government been 
trying to force concentration in 
certain sectors of the economy 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 
both as a means to control 
redundancies and overproduction in 
many industries (such as in steel) as 
well as to create national corporate 
leaders that could compete in the 
international economy (such as in 
petroleum)? In which case, wouldn’t 
a policy of liberalising monopolies 
at this point work against these 
objectives, particularly given 
overcapacity in the current economic 
slowdown? Isn’t the question of 
employment creation a problem of 
domestic demand more than capacity 
or business entry? Also, how much of 
the employment generation problem 
is rooted in rising inequality?
ZL: During the 1990s a policy was 
undertaken to guide the reform of 
state-owned enterprises; so called ‘Zhua 
Da Fang Xiao’. It means: privatise the 
smaller state-owned enterprises and let 
them compete in the market without 
state support, while keeping the larger 
ones under state ownership and giving 
them stronger and more concentrated 
public support. The implementation 
of this policy accelerated the 
marketisation process but at the same 
time it has had the side effect that, 
with the preferential treatment from 
the government, some of the large 
state-owned enterprises have tended 
to become monopolies. A few of 
these monopolies have joined the 
group of internationally large firms, 
such as PetroChina Co. Ltd and China 
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation. 
However they have not seemed to 
be internationally competitive due 
to their governance structure under 
the governmental administration. For 
instance, the top managers of the state-
owned giant firms are appointed by the 
government and some of them have 
been officials without sufficient business 
management training. On the other 
hand, the internationally competitive 
firms are mainly small- and medium-
sized non-state owned enterprises. That 
is why no one in China now considers 
that anti-monopoly policies would affect 
the international competitiveness of the 
large monopolist firms. 
Moreover, at present job creation is the 
most important goal of policies, more 
than anything else in the context of the 
current economic recession, given that 
it is closely related to social stability. 
Without job and asset creation, there is 
no increase in household income. Then 
domestic demand, especially domestic 
demand generated by consumption, 
cannot be effectively stimulated.
The obstacle to employment generation 
in relation to rising inequality lies 
mainly in the discrimination against 
rural people. The urban-rural income 
gap explains over 40 per cent of the 
nation-wide income inequality across 
households. This problem has already 
drawn the attention of both the general 
public and top policy makers. It was also 
a focal point in the policy discussions 
that took place in the Conference of the 
People’s Congress at the beginning of 
March 2009.
AF: Recently you were researching 
the impact of rising food prices on 
poor people in China. What were 
your main insights? And how have 
these insights changed in the current 
economic crisis, given that food prices 
have now fallen sharply?
ZL: Our data analysis based on the 
national household sample survey 
shows that the food price hike during 
2007 damaged the food and nutrition 
security of the rural poor. The shock 
of rising food prices affected the 
livelihoods of the urban poor less than 
the rural poor. This was due to the 
broad coverage of certain urban social 
protection programmes, such as the 
Minimum Living Standard guarantee 
programme. The same programme for 
the rural areas was established later 
than the urban programme and has 
been extremely underfunded due to 
the weaker financial capacity of the 
local governments in the rural areas. 
Moreover, the rural pension programme 
has not yet been set up in most rural 
areas and the integration of the rural 
migrants into urban social protection 
programmes is still a problem to be 
solved.   
At present, international food prices 
are falling but dangers to food security 
in the developing world, including 
China, still exist. The current economic 
crises affect food security in two ways: 
reduced investment in agriculture will 
lead to a decline in food supply; and a 
decrease in the income of the poor will 
result in a reduction of their ability to 
purchase food. Therefore, the end of 
the price crisis does not necessarily 
mean relief from the threat of food and 
nutrition insecurity for the poor.
More specifically, China has been facing 
such a serious drought in the spring 
season of 2009. This will certainly lead 
to a decrease in food production in 
the summer harvest. As a result, both 
food security and farmers’ income 
have continued to be a great concern 
for both the general public and the 
government. The State has been 
increasing its financing of agricultural 
investment so that food production 
might increase in the autumn harvest of 
this year. It has also been strengthening 
social protection programmes since 
the beginning of the slow-down in the 
domestic economy. This will alleviate the 
shocks of the economic crisis on lower 
income groups, including the poor. 
AF: Given all of these domestic 
challenges, what could or should 
be China’s international role in the 
current global economic crisis? 
In a globalised world that is facing an 
economic recession, what China can and 
should do is, on the one hand, promote 
and participate in the international 
collaboration for the reconstruction of 
more strict rules to supervise financial 
activities; and on the other hand, adjust 
its own growth model and reduce its 
foreign trade imbalance. A successful 
transition of the Chinese growth 
model to a more resource-saving and 
environmentally-friendly one, and more 
healthy economic growth in China 
would make great contributions to 
current attempts to bail-out the world 
economy.
AF: Thank you very much for your 
time and valuable insights!
ZL: Thank you for your interest in 
China’s development. It is a difficult 
process but it is also a very exciting 
issue to challenge the capacities of 
contemporary intellectuals.
Zhu Ling is Deputy Director of the Institute of 
Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
She was interviewed by Andrew Fischer, lecturer in 
Population and Social Policy at ISS.
the Current soCIal seCurIty 
Complex – an overvIeW
The assortment of social security 
schemes that currently exist do not 
constitute an integrated whole, hence 
the term ‘complex’ instead of ‘system’. 
Broadly they are aimed at the following:
•	 Poverty alleviation; 
•	 Income maintenance in the event of 
unemployment, occupational injury, 
sickness and retirement;
•	 Subsidised, including free, medical 
care as and when needed.
The schemes divide into the familiar 
categories of ‘social insurance’ and 
‘social assistance (social safety net)’ 
(Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 
Sept 2004). Both categories include a 
variety of schemes and the distinction 
between them is based on two salient 
aspects: first, the conditions attached 
to the provision of benefit (entitlement 
qualification) and second, the method 
of financing. 
By design, social assistance is means 
tested, which in China can be stringent 
and intrusive. Being non-contributory, 
social assistance schemes have to be 
financed from general government 
revenue, which leads to the vexed issue 
of the apportionment of expenditure 
responsibilities among government 
tiers. The contributory schemes fall 
into two categories: Social Insurance 
for the urban population; and two rural 
schemes: the local pension schemes 
and the ‘Rural Cooperative Medical 
Insurance Scheme’ (RCMIS). 
Taken together, the contributory 
and non-contributory schemes are 
characterised by two salient features:
•	 segmentation and striking 
differences in provision across 
groups;
•	 highly decentralized financing and 
management.
segmentatIon
The abiding feature of the Chinese 
social security complex has been the 
deep division between the rural and 
the urban population and the glaring 
contrast between their respective 
social security entitlements. This 
division dates from the pre-reform 
period (pre-1978) and still survives, 
though increasingly blurred at the 
edges. The urban population benefits 
from a complementary combination 
Social Security System for a 
Harmonious Society
Athar Hussain
As part of its plan to establish a 
harmonious society, the Chinese 
leadership has resolved to establish 
an integrated social security system 
by 2020 that would cover the whole 
population. This paper aims to provide 
an overview of the present system 
and consider the prospects for the 
establishment of an integrated system 
by 2020.
An urban contstuction site / Andrew Fischer
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of contributory Social Insurance, 
providing old-age pension, work injury 
compensation, health care insurance, 
maternity benefit and unemployment 
compensation, and means-tested social 
assistance (Minimum Living Standard 
Assistance - MLSA), which bridges any 
shortfall of household per capita income 
from the local poverty line. 
In contrast, the social security provision 
for the rural population is sparse. 
Bar a few minor exceptions, the rural 
schemes are non-contributory social 
assistance schemes aimed at alleviating 
severe hardship and narrowly targeted, 
either towards households passing a 
means test or towards the residents of 
designated localities. There are two 
professed rationales for the limited 
social protection cover in China’s rural 
areas.  One is that each rural household 
is assigned a plot of agricultural land 
that serves as a floor to household 
income, a feature that is particular to 
China and a few other economies. The 
other is the high cost of introducing a 
social security regime comparable to 
the one in urban areas relative to the 
limited capacity to collect taxes and 
social security contributions in rural 
areas. Both are valid, but only under 
strong qualifications. The protection 
provided by land plots is highly variable 
and has diminished over time because 
of the combination of the increase in 
the rural population and the diversion 
of land to non-farm uses. The latter 
has given rise to a substantial rural 
population without any land.    
deCentralIsatIon
Both rural and urban social security 
systems are highly decentralised, the 
former more than the latter. In the 
case of the urban schemes, although 
Social Insurance and MLSA are based 
on regulations issued by the central 
government, many of the details of the 
schemes are left to the discretion of the 
provincial or municipal governments. 
More consequential, for both Social 
Insurance and MLSA the budgetary 
units are 269 cities (excluding county-
level cities and towns); and generally 
cities are expected to cover from their 
own budgets any deficit on Social 
Insurance and the cost of MLSA in their 
respective jurisdictions. In many cases, 
cities with a comparatively heavier 
burden of MLSA have more strained 
budgets because the factors that cause 
households to slip into poverty also act 
as a drag on city finances. 
There are ad hoc transfers from the 
central and provincial governments 
to lower tier governments so they can 
meet their social security obligations 
under Social Insurance and MLSA. But 
there is as yet no regular framework 
for fiscal transfers from higher to lower 
government tiers to cover expenditure 
responsibilities of the latter. An overhaul 
of the system of inter-governmental 
finances has been high on the reform 
agenda for a number of years but 
still remains to be realised. A pooling 
of Social Insurance contributions 
and expenditures at the provincial 
level is the policy aim. There are 11 
or so provinces, including province-
level cities, that in various ways pool 
contributions and expenditure. But 
there is as yet no preferred framework 
for pooling. 
Integrated soCIal seCurIty 
system
Though not spelt out explicitly, the 
common assumption is that the 
integrated system would provide to 
the whole population the same high 
level of protection that a section of the 
urban population currently enjoys. The 
promised system will not only close 
the rural-urban gap but also fill the 
large gaps in coverage that mar the 
present rural and urban systems. The 
goal is ambitious and the time allowed 
to achieve the goal is very limited. 
The closing of the rural-urban gap will 
require a lot more than simply raising 
the social security provision in rural 
areas to the level in urban areas. The 
rural-urban distinction is not confined 
to the social security field but runs wide 
and deep to the institutional structure of 
the government, public finances and the 
provision of social goods such as basic 
education and health care. 
The establishment of an integrated 
system has to take into account the 
implications of the following:
•	 The rural per capita income is a 
small fraction of the urban per 
capita income. In 2005, the rural net 
income per capita was slightly less 
than a third of the urban disposable 
per capita income;
•	 The variation in rural per capita 
income is far wider than that in 
urban per capita income;
•	 A large percentage of rural 
households have a piece of land 
each, which historically has served 
as a justification for providing 
restricted social security cover to 
the rural population; 
•	 Internal migrants are huge in 
numbers and mobile across 
localities.
The first suggests that applying the 
same schedule of contributions and 
benefits for Social Insurance schemes 
to both rural and urban population may 
lead to a much lower participation rate 
amongst the former than amongst the 
latter. There are two possibilities for 
raising the participation rate amongst 
the rural population to the level found 
amongst the urban population. One 
is to charge rural residents a lower 
contribution rate in return for a lower 
benefit. The other approach is to keep 
the same schedule of contribution 
and benefit but raise the government 
contribution to offset any financial 
shortfall caused by the inclusion of the 
rural population. This fits in with the 
spirit of an integrated social security 
system but it is premised on the 
continued improvement in the public 
finances as seen over the last few years. 
The greater variation in income per 
head in rural localities compared to 
urban localities suggests a fundamental 
incompatibility between an integrated 
social security system and the financial 
and operational decentralization that 
characterises the present system. The 
obverse of decentralization is variation 
in the levels of provision and facilities. 
Extending the current system to cover 
rural localities would further widen the 
variation and may make the integrated 
system non-viable. The implication is 
that the construction of an integrated 
social security system has to go 
together with raising the budgetary unit 
to the provincial level.
Turning to the land plot as a substitute 
for social security, the average area of 
land plot per household varies across 
villages even in close vicinity; as do the 
climate and location. The cultivated area 
per rural inhabitant is low: slightly less 
than a fifth of hectare (0.19) and falling 
because of the diversion of land to non-
agricultural uses. The implication is that 
land plots do not provide full protection 
against a fall into poverty. Further, not all 
rural households have a land plot each 
and the number of landless households 
has in recent years risen sharply. A 
rough estimate puts their number at 40 
million which is around 10 per cent of 
total rural households. The argument 
is that treating household land plots 
as a justification for providing the rural 
population with reduced social security 
cover was weak to begin with and has 
been rendered even weaker by recent 
developments. 
Migrants represent a huge blind spot in 
the current social security coverage. This 
is due to two factors. First, they are not 
recognised as residents of the localities 
where they may have been living and 
working for a long time. Second, the 
current social security schemes are 
financed and operated on a highly 
decentralised basis and there is as yet 
no national framework for the portability 
of contributions and benefits. 
A vast majority of migrant workers are 
from rural localities and their inclusion in 
the social security system would seem to 
be a first step towards the construction 
of an integrated system. There are 
two aspects to the participation of 
immigrants in Social Insurance schemes:
•	  collection of contributions;
•	  disbursement of benefits.
The problems raised by the first are, 
in principle, the same for immigrants 
and residents. The only difference is 
that, compared to the latter, the former 
are more likely to be in jobs with low 
rates of Social Insurance coverage, 
such as casual or informal employment. 
Concerning the second, one needs 
to distinguish between schemes 
where contributions and benefits 
run concurrently and where they are 
separated in time.  The former include 
disability and injury compensation and 
medical care insurance, which can be 
extended to immigrant workers without 
any problem. Some cities already do 
so. The latter group includes old-age 
pension that raises a particular problem 
because of the long time gap between 
the payment of contributions and the 
receipt of benefits and the absence of a 
national framework for the accumulation 
of contributions paid in various localities 
and the portability of pensions.  An 
interim solution to the problem is to 
set up a special scheme for migrant 
workers that is managed by the central 
government.
What are the prospects for the 
establishment of an integrated social 
security system by 2020? Two of 
the principal pre-conditions for the 
development of such a system are now 
present. First, the last few years have 
seen a dramatic improvement in the 
public finances and this trend looks 
likely to continue. The implication is that 
the government would be increasingly 
capable of covering the extra cost of 
setting up an integrated social security 
system. Second, the leadership is 
strongly committed to establishing such 
a system.
Athar Hussain is Professor and Director of the 
Asia Research Centre at the London School of 
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declining to around 1.5 in the 2000s as 
more Chinese became urban residents. 
Financial and other administrative 
incentive and disincentive measures 
have been widely used in the 
programme. The programme requires 
couples to reduce the number of 
children they produce, but is unable 
by it itself to provide adequate social 
support for people to adjust their 
family planning strategy or to provide 
necessary compensation for couples to 
alleviate the life risks associated with 
low fertility. Punitive packages, in some 
cases turning into serious coercive 
actions, were used particularly in the 
1980s by local cadres, despite the 
government emphasis on Mass Line 
and against coercion in general (see E. 
Winckler, 2002). 
Despite these shortcomings, China’s 
family planning programme has 
brought about dramatic changes in 
people’s fertility behaviour in a relatively 
short period, and successfully slowed 
down the rapid population growth in 
China, with a profound impact on the 
stabilisation of the world population.
varIed soCIal and eConomIC 
development and soCIetal 
Changes 
There is no doubt that government 
commitment and efficient 
implementation of family planning 
programmes are the major determinants 
of China’s rapid fertility decline. It 
is also evident that in addition to 
the government’s population policy, 
the general level of socio-economic 
development is another crucial 
determinant of China’s regional fertility 
variation. China’s fertility transition 
is a process of diffusion: it started 
in some relatively well developed 
regions and urban centres, and then 
diffused to other parts of China.  The 
complex population policy reflects the 
greatly varied economic and social 
realities in different Chinese regions. 
Furthermore, the differential local policy 
is a compromise between the central 
guidance on population control and the 
local situation, both in terms of socio-
economic development and the political 
commitment of the local government. 
There have always been gaps between 
the targets set by the programme 
and public acceptance, but the gaps 
have reduced with time as traditional 
patterns of marriage have undergone 
a gradual shift. The average age at 
first marriage for China as a whole 
increased from 22.23 years in 1990 to 
23.14 years in 2000, a 0.91 year rise 
over a ten-year period. The trend of 
delaying marriage is continuing and 
more visible in big cities. Small family 
size is widely accepted by the public 
and has become a social norm in both 
urban and rural areas, especially in more 
developed regions and among the 
young generation. 
Economic independence and the high 
cost of marriage and childbearing are 
some of the causes behind this trend.  
In addition, the increasing number of 
women enjoying higher education, 
particularly true in urban areas, is 
contributing to delayed marriage.  
China’s social transformation has 
brought with it fundamental changes in 
family functions, relations and structures. 
Young people nowadays are much 
better educated and up-to-date with 
modern technologies, and have become 
more individualistic. Delaying marriage, 
the DINK family model (double-income 
no kids), and cohabitation before 
rapId fertIlIty deClIne 
Early fertility decline emerged in 
China’s urban areas in the mid-1960s 
attributed partially to the availability 
of contraceptive services provided to 
urban residents. China’s nationwide 
fertility transition started in the early 
1970s with a government-sponsored 
family planning programme. The 
national total fertility rate declined 
sharply from 5.8 in 1970 to 2.8 in 1979, 
a decrease of more than fifty per cent. 
China’s total fertility rate dropped to 
below replacement level in the 1990s 
and has remained there since. This 
fertility transition is characterised by its 
rapidity and has profound impacts on 
China’s socio-economic development. 
It has been a subject of controversy 
whether fertility in China has been 
dropping as rapidly as indicated by 
the official statistics. The debate has 
focused on the accuracy of China’s 
fertility statistics or estimates, though 
general consensus is that China’s total 
fertility rate is below replacement level, 
ranging from 1.5 to 1.8.  
There have always been marked 
regional variations in fertility levels 
between China’s provincial units, but the 
gap has been narrowing in recent years.  
This phenomenon is clearly associated 
with the different paths of fertility 
transition among China’s regions. Big 
municipalities such as Shanghai and 
Beijing began their fertility decline as 
early as in the mid-1960s. On the other 
hand, fertility transition only started 
in the 1980s in some of the western 
provinces such as Qinghai.  
strong government 
InterventIon and effICIent 
famIly plannIng programme 
The current attitude of the Chinese 
government to the population issue 
can be described as ‘maintaining the 
below-replacement fertility, taking 
comprehensive measures to cope with 
China’s population problems’, including 
controlling population numbers, 
improving quality of life, and making 
efforts to solve the aging problem (see 
government document, December 
2006). 
The success of China’s birth control 
policy has for a long time been 
heavily dependent on government 
administrative intervention. The 
proposal of ‘One Child Policy’ was 
first put forward in 1979 and became 
fully operational in the early 1980s. 
The current national family planning 
policy took its original form in the 
mid-1980s and, since 1991, the political 
commitment to population control has 
been reaffirmed. Programmes were 
initialised by the central government 
and carried out through a top-down 
administrative network. The programme 
mobilises the entire government 
mechanism through comprehensive 
management and co-operation 
between governmental departments 
and non-governmental organisations 
and all relevant social and economic 
policies must be in compliance with the 
central government’s population policy.
Despite this, one of the marked features 
of China’s family planning programme 
is its decentralised policy formation and 
operation. Local authorities have been 
given some flexibility, under general 
guidance from the central government, 
in adapting the national policy to the 
vast regional differentials in social, 
economic and cultural conditions. As a 
result, the rigid ‘one child per couple 
policy’ is implemented mainly in urban 
areas while the majority of rural families 
are permitted 1.5 to 2 children. The 
rationale for this is that farmer families 
depend on strong labour for agricultural 
production and family support (primarily 
provided by married son(s)) in old age 
as there is almost no well-functioning 
government-sponsored pension system 
operating for Chinese farmers (see 
article by Athar Hussain on page 9). 
Families belonging to minorities are 
entitled to have even more children.  
In this sense, the ‘One Child Policy’ is 
an overly simplified term. If all Chinese 
couples followed local family planning 
regulations, the total cohort fertility rate 
in China would be 1.62 for the 1990s, 
Fertility transition in China over 
the last 30 years
Xizhe Peng
Chinese society has undergone a very rapid transformation during the period of China’s reform and openness over the last 30 
years. Traditional Chinese society was based primarily on family and kinship: reproduction, or child bearing, was therefore viewed 
as one of the principal duties of male family members. To have sons, at least one son, was one of the prevailing fertility desires, as 
sons were responsible for the continuation of the family line, provision of old-age support, and general security for family members. 
While the basic norms of family formation remain, fertility and behaviour have changed over the last half a century, with much more 
rapid changes occurring over the last 30 years. 
A Chinese wedding / Andrew Fischer
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marriage etc. are widely practised in 
China at present. 
Furthermore, the large-scale rural 
to urban migration and the huge 
economic opportunities created by 
China’s economic reform have become 
two of the decisive factors affecting 
China’s fertility trend. It is estimated 
that more than 140 million farmers 
have moved from their villages and are 
working in cities and eastern regions. 
The overwhelming majority of them are 
young labourers aged 20-40 years old. 
Research shows that the fertility level 
of these migrants is commonly lower 
than their peers in the countryside, but 
higher than their urban counterparts. 
the future perspeCtIve  
China’s experience in family planning 
has shown that rapid fertility decline 
can be achieved in the context of low 
level socioeconomic development. 
Government commitment and efficient 
social mobilization are the major factors 
in the success of fertility decline, at least 
in the earlier stages. China’s success has 
also benefited from its special political 
and administrative institutional system, 
even though there are high social and 
economic costs to China’s achievement 
in birth control. Given China’s current 
socio-political settings, the central 
government’s population policy will 
decide the basic level of China’s fertility 
for the coming years. Deviation from 
this will be determined jointly by the 
government’s ability to enforce its 
population policy and programme, 
societal change caused by China’s 
social, economic and political reform, 
and people’s general desire for family 
size.
There are increasing concerns about the 
negative effects of very low fertility and 
debate on modification of China’s family 
planning regulations has been intensive 
in recent years. On the one hand, there 
is the fear of the vulnerability of China’s 
fertility transition and the possibility of 
fertility rebound if the government loses 
control on population issues. China’s 
increased demands for food and energy, 
and the environmental pressure from a 
larger population are some of the main 
arguments used in favour of keeping the 
current population policy. 
On the other hand, scholars argue that 
current fertility in China has already 
been too low and will not be able 
to recover if population policy is not 
modified quite soon (Wang Feng, 2005). 
The ageing population has become a 
widely discussed topic and China may 
be the first major country to become 
old before it becomes rich. There are 
fears of a huge social welfare crisis 
caused by rapid population aging. 
The experiences of European and 
Eastern Asian countries in reversing 
low fertility are often cited to support 
the proposal to relax birth control and 
options for possible policy changes 
have been suggested by researchers 
(see for example, Zeng Yi, 2007).  It is 
however more likely that China’s present 
population policy and family planning 
programme will remain intact for the 
coming few years. Meanwhile, gradual 
modification or relaxation of birth 
control is expected at least in some 
local areas in China’s coastal regions. 
Along with strong government 
commitment, China’s family planning 
programme has now put more 
emphasis on voluntary participation 
by Chinese couples. Efforts have been 
made to promote education and 
information dissemination, and on 
provision of a better, continuous and 
regular contraceptive service. While 
societal interests remain the major 
rationale for China’s population policy 
and programme, individual rights 
get more attention.  It is certain that 
people’s voluntary participation and 
free determination will play much more 
important roles in determining the 
future fertility level in China.  
China’s population will continue to grow 
in the future. Population will remain one 
of the decisive driving factors affecting 
China’s future development.  China will 
complete its fertility transition and enter 
a new stage of demographic transition. 
Xizhe Peng is currently professor of Population and 
Development, and serves as the Dean of Social 
Development and Public Policy，and the director of 
State Innovative Institute for Public Management 
and Public Policy Studies at Fudan University.  
Xizhe Peng has been a member of the Advisory 
Committee of China’s National Population and 
Family Planning Commission Since 1992. 
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Over the past 30 years, China has 
gone through three transitions: from 
central planning to a market economy 
and the country’s modernisation; from 
an agricultural society to an industrial 
society; and from rural life towards very 
intense urbanisation (see for example, 
Li Peilin, 2002, 2003; Sun Liping, 2003; 
and Li Peilin et al. 2008). As a result, 
today society must face great social 
and economic transformations that 
produce cleavages and fragmentation 
along lines born in a context of 
attempts to synchronise the processes 
of economic transition with those of 
structural transformation (Li Peilin et al., 
2008). A first line of fragmentation has 
emerged between the cities and the 
countryside, in particular with respect 
to rural migrants who come to look for 
jobs in the big cities but do not easily 
find any. A second line of fragmentation 
has emerged between blue collar and 
white collar workers, or, more precisely, 
between the ‘new rich’ and blue collar 
workers. A third line has emerged 
between those who work in the legal 
market economy with recognized formal 
status versus those who are forced into 
informal employment with illegal, or 
even criminal status. In this respect, 
sociological analysis in China (Li Peilin, 
2002; Li Qiang, 2002) has converged on 
the idea of a very marked fragmentation 
between cities and countryside before 
the reforms (up to the late 1970s). 
This produced a dual socio-economic 
structure, in particular through the 
household registration system (hukou), 
which in itself constituted a principle 
of social differentiation based on two 
systems of status that did not overlap 
(rural and urban). In contrast, new 
inequalities have arisen over the last 30 
years with the rise of unemployment in 
the transition to a market economy.
Internal mIgratIons and 
dIsCrImInatIons
The speed of Chinese transitions 
caused an intensification of internal 
migrations in China. The full number 
of migrants of rural or urban origin, 
defined as people not living where 
they are registered as permanent 
residents, was estimated – according 
to government statistics – between 
120 and 200 million on March 30, 2007, 
or approximately 10 per cent of the 
Chinese population. Among these 
migrants, we can distinguish between 
‘peasant-workers’ (nonmingong) and 
‘service provider-workers’ (laowugong). 
The nonmingong are mainly from 
rural areas, and are increasingly 
young, increasingly male, and more 
educationally qualified than the general 
population in their places of origin, i.e. 
they typically have at least a secondary 
school level of education (zhongxue). 
These migrants develop what I have 
called ‘intra-continental pluri-mobilities’, 
i.e. they move back and forth between 
a diversity of rural and urban job 
markets (Roulleau-Berger L. and Shi Lu, 
2004). The large increase of migratory 
movements since 1985 has weakened 
the registration system (hukou) and 
has supported the opening of broad 
mobilities of people across the country. 
This has played a role in the creation of 
interactions between the increasingly 
globalised rural and urban job markets. 
However, the status of a large majority 
of these migrants is technically ‘illegal,’ 
in the sense that they do not even have 
a certificate of temporary residence. For 
instance, it was estimated that only 50 
million migrants had this document in 
2000 (Thireau, I. and H, Linshan, 2004). 
This places the rest in situations of great 
social and economic vulnerability. 
‘New’ Chinese society, 
inequalities and fragmentation
Laurence Roulleau-Berger
Lanzhou city, Gansu province  / Andrew Fischer
‘China may be the 
first major country to 
become old before it 
becomes rich.’
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Liu Shiding (2008) identifies 
the experience of employment 
discrimination of migrants along 
institutional, social and legal lines. 
•	 Regarding institutional 
discrimination, local governments 
in some provinces try to control 
the massive numbers of arrivals 
of peasant-workers. They define 
thresholds for the recruiting of 
migrants coming from other 
provinces by requiring that each 
city respects fixed quotas. Each 
employer must make a request to 
the city hall concerning the number 
of such migrants he intends to 
engage. But these requests are not 
really checked by local authorities, 
who know that firms do not always 
apply the discriminatory policy 
towards the nonmingong. Indeed, 
employers will prefer to engage 
these migrants given that they 
are seen as more productive and 
can be paid less. Hence, these 
discriminatory policies play an 
important role in the regulation and 
segmentation of job markets, which 
is reinforced by the fact that the 
majority of peasant-workers do not 
have an urban hukou, which implies 
that they do not receive social 
protection for accidents, health and 
retirement (ibid.). 
•	 Regarding social discrimination, 
migrants are stigmatised by local 
urban residents and are treated 
like foreigners. They have a lower 
status and receive lower wages 
than locals. Competition with local 
workers also puts many of the 
more skilled or lucrative sectors of 
urban employment out of reach 
for many of the migrants, which 
is legitimated by discriminatory 
choices made by employers. On 
the basis of a survey on temporary 
residents of rural origin carried 
out in 2002 by a joint team from 
the National Bureau of Statistics 
and the Economic Research 
Centre of the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences and reported 
by Li Chunling (2008), only 7.2 per 
cent of rural employees worked 
in the public sector, 5.5 per cent 
in urban collective companies, 
and 0.6 per cent in companies 
with mixed capital (all three the 
more privileged sectors of urban 
employment), whereas 86.7 per 
cent worked for independent 
companies, typically the less 
protected and less privileged 
sectors of urban employment. 
•	 Regarding legal discrimination: 
the non-observance of labour 
laws by Chinese employers with 
respect to migrants produces legal 
discrimination. The employment 
relationship in Chinese companies 
often remains a relationship without 
contract, or with renewable short-
duration contracts or one-year 
contracts. On the basis of the 2002 
survey mentioned above, 94.7 
per cent of urban migrants had a 
temporary job, a short-duration 
contract or were independent 
workers, whereas 71.6 per cent 
of ‘local’ urban employees had a 
stable or long term job. According 
to another survey conducted 
in 2005 by the Institute of 
Population and Labor Economics 
of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, reported in Li Chunling 
(2005), 52.3 per cent of local urban 
workers had basic health insurance 
versus only 6.8 per cent of urban 
migrants.
Hence, there is a double, paradoxical 
and simultaneous movement, 
characteristic of China, of both 
strong growth and, at the same time, 
a ‘balkanisation’ of Chinese labour 
markets, which generates categories 
of ‘vulnerable’ populations such as low 
qualified migrants. Indeed, flexibility 
has become a dominant standard in the 
regulation of Chinese labour markets, 
as migrants are considered to be 
immediately available for employment, 
although this renders them objects of 
cumulative discriminations. Hence, low 
qualified migrants occupy a superfluous 
position within urban Chinese society.
InequalItIes and soCIal 
fragmentatIon
Chinese society faces a process of 
social polarisation. It is important to 
emphasize the speed with which this 
social polarisation has developed 
Shoe shiners in front of a department store near “Renmin Guangchang” (People’s Squire) in downtown 
Chongqing / Zhu Ling
over the last ten years, in a transitional 
society where the dominant forms of 
social integration operate through 
participation in the market economy, 
and where a part of the population is 
economically and socially pushed aside. 
Sun Liping (2002) posed the concept of 
a ‘fractured society’; on one side there 
is a class that he names the ‘new rich 
people’ and on the other there are two 
very impoverished social categories: 
very underprivileged social groups, 
who have always been in the North-
West and the South-West of China, and 
new categories of poor composed of 
unemployed, laid-off workers (xiagang) 
and rural migrants. New zones of social 
marginality have appeared in Chinese 
society, as a very recent and precipitous 
phenomenon which reveals this process 
of social polarisation. New zones of 
social cohesion are also forming, very 
close to those that Robert Castel (1995) 
had earlier identified in French society: 
an integration zone characterised by 
insertion into relationships of stable 
employment; a zone of disaffiliation 
where the absence of participation in 
any productive activity and relational 
insulation are combined; and a zone 
of increasingly wide vulnerability which 
associates the precariousness of work 
with the brittleness of nearby support 
systems.
As a result, income inequality has been 
hollowing out between the various 
social classes, meaning that there has 
been a structural blocking of social 
mobility, which has been redefined by 
the new market forms of integration. 
Indeed, while a Chinese rich class has 
formed and new cultural and political 
elites emerge, the status of workers 
and peasants has declined. The main 
obstacle blocking the social mobility 
of peasants results from the fact that 
industrialisation and urbanisation 
cannot offer sufficient non-agricultural 
employment. As argued by Li Chunling 
(2005), economic means were decisive 
for social mobility prior to 1949 but 
became negatively associated with 
social mobility between 1949 and 1980. 
Today, economic means as well as 
cultural, social and political affiliations 
have become decisive in processes 
of social mobility, with different 
combinations producing a diversity of 
differentiated trajectories which testify 
to the assertion of an increasingly 
stratified class society (Li Chunling, 
2005). As argued by Li Lulu (2003, 
2008), the paradox of reform in China is 
that it multiplied the opportunities for 
mobility at the same time as producing 
greater clarity with regard to boundaries 
between social groups; for example 
elites have maintained their position. 
urbanIsatIon and the bIrth of 
an underClass
The process of urbanisation stagnated 
in China from 1949 to 1979, but from 
1979 it accelerated considerably, 
alongside industrialisation and at 
a much faster pace than western 
experiences with both processes. With 
urban growth, some peasants become 
absorbed within the expanding city 
margins; they lose their land and the 
protections related to being embedded 
within a rural environment. Following 
these land requisitions, Li Youmei 
(2007) argues that a certain number 
of peasants passed from a status of 
‘subject’ under the old socialist system, 
to that of ‘marginal’ in the new socialist 
system, given that maintaining access 
to a place becomes more difficult. This 
marginalisation results from the vacuum 
between the old system of economic 
and social organization and the new 
one; one does not see transitional 
zones being formed in this process 
of accelerated urbanisation. Peasants 
lose their lands, their techniques of 
production, their feeling of belonging 
to a village and their autonomy, and 
they are constrained to finding a place 
in a new productive space without much 
assistance.
Besides these ‘shunned’ peasants, two 
categories of unemployed must be 
considered: xiagang (workers laid-off by 
their company but still receiving nominal 
subsidies, carrying out temporary work 
and still benefiting from the social 
coverage of their work unit (see Tong 
Xin, 2002)) and young graduates. 
Unlike in the past, access to a stable 
job is no longer guaranteed in Chinese 
society, given the emergence of mass 
unemployment in Chinese cities and a 
restructuring public sector that cannot 
absorb any more workers nor guarantee 
social protection for them. Indeed, since 
the beginning of the 1990s, various 
categories of unemployment have 
formed due to the reduction of the 
size of state sector employment, the 
increasing importance of the private 
sector and the deceleration of rural 
employment growth. In addition, young 
migrants, often with low qualifications, 
try to find employment in labour 
markets where they are generally 
the object of social and economic 
disqualification. As argued by Guo 
Yuhua and Chang Aishu (2005), the 
emergence of unemployment thus 
weakens the position of less qualified 
populations, who are forced into 
situations of marginalisation and social 
disaffiliation. Li Qiang (2002) calls this 
the urban underclass in Chinese cities, 
a completely new phenomenon in 
socialist China.
ConClusIon 
Today, internal migration and 
unemployment in mainland China 
have been two of the forces driving 
the reconfiguration of labour markets – 
especially urban labour markets – and 
producing new social stratification. 
There has been a marked trend towards 
the differentiation and hierarchisation 
of labour market segments. These 
processes of differentiation and 
hierarchisation not only reflect the 
pluralisation of a market economy in 
which local and global economies are 
intertwined but they also reveal the 
capacities of migrants, unemployed 
people and young people in precarious 
situations to mobilise and organise 
themselves economically. In Chinese 
society, social integration is constructed 
on the basis of conventions and norms 
that are linked both to the country’s 
communist heritage and to the 
introduction of globalised capitalism. 
Against the background of these 
developments, migrants, xiagang and 
young graduates are emerging as three 
groups that can serve as a basis for 
analysing new forms of social insecurity 
and the proliferation of new inequalities 
in Chinese cities, as well as the 
processes by which individuals within 
these groups, who are objects of social 
contempt, struggle for public and social 
recognition.
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For years people have referred to this 
legacy in terms of the ‘minzu issue’. 
Minzu is the Chinese word that is used 
to translate the Marxist concept of 
‘nationality group’, as developed in 
Marxist theories of nationalism by Stalin 
and his contemporaries. Minzu therefore 
refers to the majority Han as well as 
the Mongols, Tibetans, Uygurs, Kazaks, 
Koreans and other minority groups with 
different cultural characteristics in China. 
Despite these non-Chinese origins of 
the word minzu, there is ironically much 
confusion in the West about how to 
translate this term into English. The 
English term ‘nationality’ is often used, 
even by Chinese authorities in their 
English translations of Marxist ‘classics’. 
However, the term ‘nationality’ in the 
West refers to people’s citizenship 
of a country or nation-state. Western 
scholars or politicians who support the 
independence movements of Tibetans, 
Uyghurs and other minority groups in 
China often refer to them as ‘nations’. 
Western scholars more inclined towards 
the Chinese government tend to use 
the terms ‘ethnic groups’ or ‘ethnic 
minorities’, placing these groups on a 
similar footing as African Americans, 
Asians, or Hispanics in contemporary 
US society. The confusion between 
these three English terms (nation, 
nationality and ethnic group) has led 
some Western scholars to suggest 
that simply the Chinese transliteration 
should be used (i.e. minzu) rather than 
attempting a translation, given that 
none of the English words conveys the 
correct meaning (see Harrell, 2001: 39). 
Nonetheless, the confusion provides 
useful insights into the theoretical 
sources of ‘minzu issues’ in today’s 
China. 
In Western scholarship, it is well 
recognized that concepts related to 
modern forms of nationalism only 
became prevalent during the 17th 
and 18th centuries in Western Europe 
(see Hobsbawm, 1990: 14-20). During 
the process of building states from 
kingdoms and empires, many groups 
with different languages, cultural 
traditions and historical memories 
gradually identified themselves with a 
specific ‘nation’ and became absorbed 
into the emerging nation-states. 
These nation-states then became the 
predominant form of political entity in 
Europe and the unit of state sovereignty 
in international legal systems. While 
many factors influenced these processes 
in each case, as argued by Anderson 
(1983), the reasons that some groups 
were included or excluded depended 
to a certain extent on various internal 
and external factors along with people’s 
‘imagined communities’. 
These concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘nation-
state’ spread from Western Europe 
across the world during the colonialist 
and imperialist periods, particularly 
from the 18th-20th centuries. Most 
newly-independent states, such as 
India, followed a similar, though not 
identical ‘nation-building’ process 
following decolonisation, as did Eastern 
European countries at the beginning 
of the 20th century. The nation-building 
processes nonetheless differed in the 
West and East. As argued by Anthony 
Smith (1991: 11), western countries 
were characterised by a ‘civic model of 
nationalism’ whereas Eastern Europe 
and Asia drew more from an ‘ethnic 
concept of the nation’. In the latter, 
those groups that maintained different 
cultural characteristics were transformed 
into minority groups within the modern 
political structures of the new countries 
and were called ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ 
groups.
In the case of China, the Qing Empire 
had tried hard to turn its traditional 
multi-tribal empire into a modern 
form of ‘nation-state’, similar to the 
Tsarist Russian Empire. This was 
continued under the Republic of China, 
The key to understanding and 
interpreting ethnic relations in 
contemporary China
Rong Ma
Recent events in Tibet have brought renewed international attention to the issue of ethnic relations in China. In order to 
understand the situation in Tibet, Xinjiang and other minority areas in China, we need to look at the wider historical framework 
of ‘nation-building’ in modern China and the ideological background of ‘nation’ theory in Marxism and Leninism. Otherwise, our 
attention will be led to focus on details in the present, such as human rights, the legitimacy of street demonstrations, or the proper 
ways of handling terrorist attacks, while ignoring the ‘deep footprint’ of minority-majority relationships in contemporary China. Only 
by understanding this legacy can the direction of possible solutions be found. 
established in 1911, which was called 
a ‘republic of five groups’. Sun Yat-sen 
announced that ‘nationalism in China is 
based on the state’, and in his oath of 
Presidency of the Republic, he called 
for ‘unifying the territories of the Han, 
Manchu, Mongol, Hui (Xinjiang) and 
Tibetans as a state, and unifying the 
Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui (Muslim) 
and Tibetans as one people, that is 
the unification of the Chinese nation’. 
In this way, he tried to establish the 
country as a modern form of ‘nation-
state’ (republic) based on an invented 
notion of a ‘Chinese nation’ that 
included the non-Han inhabitants of the 
imperial hinterlands. After Sun Yat-sen’s 
death, Chiang Kaishek and the KMT 
government followed this framework 
of ‘Chinese nation’ and denied the 
Mongols, Manchu, Tibetans, Uyghurs 
and other groups the status of ‘nations’.
In this respect, the approach of the 
Chinese Communist Part (CCP), which 
defeated the KMT in 1949, was different. 
The CCP adopted the framework and 
definition of minzu (nation/nationality) 
from Stalin. In the 1930s, Stalin and the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
organised a campaign of ‘nationality 
recognition (identification)’ and over 
one hundred ‘nationalities’ were 
recognised. Their members received 
an official ‘nationality status’ and 
‘republics’ were established for the 
large ‘nationalities’, which resulted in 
a politicisation of ethnicity. According 
to the Constitution of the Union, all of 
these republics had a right to become 
independent sovereign nations. This 
framework was a key factor in the 
collapse of the USSR when the political 
climate changed.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
followed a similar path, basing its 
policies towards minority groups 
on Stalinist theory. In the 1950s, 
the government also launched a 
campaign of ‘nationality recognition 
(identification)’ and recognised 
56 ‘nationalities’ based on Stalin’s 
definitional criteria (common territory, 
language, economic mode, and 
psychological nature manifested 
in a common culture). A variety 
of ‘autonomous areas’ were also 
established in places where various 
‘nationalities’ were concentrated, 
which together make up 64 per cent of 
Chinese territory. The only difference 
between the Soviet and Chinese model 
is that the constitution of the PRC does 
not offer the right of political separation 
to its ‘nationalities’ and China is not 
a union of republics but one republic 
that practices ‘regional autonomy’ for 
minority ‘nationalities’. This has resulted 
in a double-level structure of nation-
building; an upper level composed of 
the Chinese nation (Zhonghua Minzu) 
and a local level of 56 ‘nationalities’ 
(minzu).   
The Chinese government has also 
issued many policies in favour of 
minorities. For example, in the practice 
of family planning programmes, 
minority members can have two 
children per couple while the Han are 
only allowed to have one. Minority 
students can receive additional points 
in examinations (in Inner Mongolia) or 
enjoy quotas (in Xinjiang) for university 
admission. Top positions in the local 
administration of autonomous areas 
are only offered to minority cadres, 
and minority residents usually receive 
more financial subsidies in welfare 
programmes. However, these policies 
have often politicised group identities 
while at the same time created tensions 
given that the Han majority often feels 
discriminated against. 
Similar to the Russian case, group 
consciousness and boundaries in 
China have become stronger and 
wider under the political and social 
systems since the 1950s. Particularly 
since the break-up of the Soviet Union 
and its various republics seceded, it is 
natural that nationalism and requests 
for independence emerged among 
the minority minzu in China, especially 
for those with large populations and 
distinct languages and territories, such 
as Tibetans and Uyghurs. This is key 
to understanding and interpreting the 
‘minzu problem’ in contemporary China. 
Nonetheless, there are several factors 
that have had positive impacts on the 
stability of ethnic relations in China 
over the past six decades. First is the 
predominance of the Han majority; the 
Han consisted of 94 per cent of the 
total population in 1953 and 91 per cent 
in 2005. Second, the Han regions are 
much more economically and socially 
advanced, providing products and 
incomes to support the nation. Third, 
the central government has introduced 
many favourable policies towards 
minorities and provided huge financial 
subsidies to autonomous regions (eg. 
the central government provided about 
28 billion yuan to the Tibet Autonomous 
Region in 2008). Fourth, many members 
of minority groups have co-existed with 
the Han for centuries and have been 
assimilated. 
Other factors which used to play a role 
in keeping the country together are now 
changing. For example, the communist 
revolutions in both the USSR and the 
PRC brought with them many benefits 
to the poor people of both majority 
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and minority groups: land reform 
programmes gave land and cattle to 
poor farmers and herdsmen and poor 
workers became the ‘leading class’ in 
urban areas. Hence, these common 
people supported the Communist Party 
and its policies, including its policies 
on nationality affairs. The Communist 
ideology, as expressed by charismatic 
revolutionary leaders, became a 
theoretical tie binding the worker-farmer 
classes together under the leadership 
of the Communist Party. As these 
leaders died, their ideological influence 
gradually vanished. The system of 
planned economy and division of 
production among autonomous 
areas was also weakened when it was 
replaced with the market economy. 
Furthermore, although the theory of 
‘nationality’ and the system of regional 
autonomy based on this theory still 
dominates in China, there are many 
gaps between the theory and daily 
practice. In many autonomous areas 
the Han constitutes a majority (eg. 79.2 
per cent of the population in Inner 
Mongolia, 65.4 per cent in Ningxia 
and 61.6 per cent in Guangxi). Han 
also constitute a significant part of the 
population in Xinjiang (40.6 per cent vs. 
46.1 per cent Uyghurs). In this sense, the 
Tibet Autonomous Region represents 
a very special case with a small Han 
population (6.1 per cent). In contrast, 
minority populations only consist of 
12-15 per cent of the total population in 
many autonomous counties around the 
country. 
Where the minority forms the ‘leading 
group’ in an autonomous area and has 
issued policies and regulations in favour 
of this group, the Han majority often 
feel discriminated against, leading to 
conflict. Moreover, the leading group 
might consider the autonomous area 
as its own territory and make efforts to 
prevent in-migration of other groups 
and to keep control of natural resources 
under its own management. This again 
causes reactions from other groups and 
the central government.
The ‘nationality’ quota system for official 
appointments in the government also 
leads to a variety of contradictions 
that undermine legitimacy. On the one 
hand, it helps some minority candidates 
achieve positions they are not really 
qualified for, resulting in a reduction in 
administrative efficiency, on the other 
hand, although top administrative 
positions in autonomous areas are only 
open to ‘natives’ of the minority group, 
the Han usually occupy the position of 
Party Secretary, which is where the real 
authority lies. Also, the same policy 
prevents the minorities from competing 
for higher positions within provincial 
or central governments because the 
allocation of such positions among 
groups is designated according to their 
population sizes. While the minorities 
feel this lack of ‘real’ autonomy, the 
central government considers this 
power structure to be a basic guarantor 
of unification, which explains why the 
Chinese Communist Party has been very 
cautious about reforming this political 
system. 
Similarly, despite efforts to provide a 
dual education system for minorities, 
minorities often end up facing severe 
disadvantages in the job market 
because of their lower average 
education levels, their inferior linguistic 
abilities in Chinese language, or 
because of cultural differences. 
When a group has been officially 
recognized by the central government, 
foreign authorities and the elites of 
the group, and when this group has 
its own ‘territory’ in the form of a 
republic or autonomous region, the 
desire to become an independent 
nation through the ‘right of self-
determination’ emerges, supported by 
both nationalist theories in the West 
and the Marxist theory of ‘nationality’. 
This is a key ideological-political 
source of separatism among minority 
‘nationalities’ in China today. In this 
sense, the Soviet model followed by 
the PRC can be called a strategy of 
‘politicisation’ of minority groups. 
This model turns traditional minority 
‘tribal states’ into modern ‘nations/
nationalities’ and turns the country 
into a ‘union of many nations/
nationalities’. The problem and danger 
of nationalist separation was therefore 
actually created, at least in part, by 
the authorities of the USSR and China 
themselves in the process of ‘nation-
building’.
Based on this opinion, I suggested 
rethinking the strategy of ‘nation-
building’ in China practiced since the 
1950s (Ma 2007). The ‘culturisation’ 
strategy towards minority groups in 
the US and India might be a better 
alternative for China in the future. 
I believe that only when minority 
‘nationalities’ in China are transformed 
into ‘ethnic groups’, the ‘minzu’ issue 
and ethnic tension can decline. While 
this challenge to the ‘orthodox’ Marxist 
minzu theory has been heavily criticized 
in China, the freedom of academic 
discussions in China needs to be 
improved to enable us to face reality 
and provide a more scientific base for 
policy-making. 
In the meantime, the policies in favour 
of minorities should continue, but 
the target of these policies should be 
gradually switched from ‘all members of 
minority groups’ to all residents of ‘poor 
areas’, then to ‘all individual citizens 
who need the help’. Similarly, the 
administrative structure of autonomous 
areas should be maintained for a 
period of time but the sense of a 
‘nationality’s territory’ should be 
reduced gradually. The dual system of 
schools in autonomous areas should 
continue, while various kinds of bilingual 
education facilities should be offered 
to all members of minority groups. 
The situation of ethnic stratification in 
Chinese society should be systematically 
studied and the government should 
establish programmes to help minority 
members who are disadvantaged in 
terms of language or other skills.  
In general, the future of the ‘minzu 
issue’ and ethnic relations in China 
largely depends on the direction of 
government strategy. Of course, it will 
also be related to the level of economic 
development and to cautious political 
reform in China. 
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Since 2007, ISS has been cooperating 
with the Xinjiang Agricultural University 
(XAU) on research looking at the 
livelihood strategies of small-scale 
farmers of mostly Uyghur origin in the 
Southwest of the province, within the 
limitations of the water scarcity and 
environmental degradation that they 
confront (see map below). The joint 
research programme (2007-2010) is 
financed by the Royal Academy of Arts 
and Sciences (KNAW) as part of the 
China Exchange Programme (CEP), and 
is supported by the Chinese Ministry 
of Science and Technology (MOST). 
The ISS team is led by Max Spoor and 
includes Murat Arsel, Kristin Komives 
and Anirban Dasgupta. The XUA 
team, which involves academic staff 
from the Colleges of Economics and 
Management, and of Environmental 
Sciences, is led by Professor Pu 
Chunling and includes Prof. Jiang 
Pingan amongst others. The first year of 
cooperation was successfully completed 
and the KNAW recently approved the 
funding for 2009. 
The research investigates how the 
livelihood strategies and resource use 
of small farmers in Southwest Xinjiang 
are changing in the face of current 
transformations in domestic markets 
and in government policies towards 
the agricultural sector. This is an arid 
region with a scarcity and unequal 
distribution of water and widespread 
soil salinization. The study uses village 
and household surveys, and household 
case-studies in order to understand the 
linkages between cotton production 
and environmental degradation of water 
and land resources on the one hand, 
and household income generation and 
the reduction of income poverty on 
the other. It is carried out in rural areas 
of Xinjiang that contain a substantial 
number of poor and vulnerable 
households, mostly of minority Uyghur 
nationality (i.e. ethnicity). This minority 
accounted for a majority of the 
provincial population in the 1950s, but 
the influx of (Han) Chinese migrants 
in the 1950s and 1960s as part of a 
population transfer policy, and more 
recently due to the oil-boom in the 
province, has brought the Uyghur share 
below 50 per cent (around 9 million of 
the more than 20 million people). These 
rural households are transforming their 
livelihood strategies in the context 
of now largely privatised input and 
output markets, changing property 
rights systems, degradation of the 
environment, and a policy framework 
that has become less interventionist 
and more market-oriented and 
decentralised since the late 1990s.
Xinjiang province is one of the poorer 
provinces in China; if measured by 
average rural household income per 
person, it was the 7th ‘poorest’ province 
of 31 provinces in China in 2006, with 
an average per person rural income 
of 2,737 yuan (an estimated 340 USD). 
Thirteen minority ‘nationalities’ are 
indigenous to the province, of which 
the Uyghur are by far the largest 
group. The province is one of the main 
providers of raw materials and food for 
the rest of China; it produces 32 per 
cent of the domestic cotton output 
(in 2006), while its oil industry is also 
booming. Xinjiang has therefore been 
of strategic importance for successive 
Chinese states, and soon after the civil 
war ended in 1949 a massive wave of 
migration from other parts of China was 
launched. Among other results, this led 
to the establishment of the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps 
(XPCC), known as the Bin Tuan, which 
were organised as large-scale state 
farms (also known as regiment farms 
because of their military command 
structure). Hence, a bi-modal agrarian 
structure emerged, with many (often 
minority Uyghur) small farmers (with 0.7 
hectare of farmland on average) and the 
large regiment farms of the Bin Tuan. 
ISS/XAU/KNAW Research Project 
in Rural Xinjiang
MAX SPOOR
 Uyghur household interviewed in cotton field (Awati County, Aksu Prefecture) / Max Spoor
...a strategy of 
‘politicisation’ of 
minority groups...
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Through the course of these 
developments, cotton has been 
become a main crop in Xinjiang. For 
many small farmers in the southwest 
of the province, it is a crucial income 
earner. Their substantial dependency 
on income from cotton is due to their 
very small farms, the fact that the 
government still prioritises cotton 
and grain production, and limited 
opportunities for off-farm work. 
Nevertheless, cotton is a cash crop. It 
can be produced with high net returns 
per hectare in agro-ecological areas 
that possess certain ‘resource-based’ 
comparative advantages, particularly 
water. However, resource degradation 
is severe in many parts of Xinjiang, 
particularly in terms of soil salinization, 
and decreasing water quality and 
availability. There are water shortages in 
the downstream areas of the rivers, such 
as in the southwest and southeast of 
the province where Uyghur populations 
are especially concentrated. Other 
underlying factors include overuse of 
water resources through inefficient 
surface irrigation (and leaching 
practices), low quality drainage systems, 
and the continuous cropping of cotton 
(and even sometimes rice), which 
consume large quantities of water per 
hectare. Also, if cotton prices are low, 
as happened in late 2008, this has the 
effect of depressing the incomes of 
these small farmers.
Hence, the livelihood strategies of small 
farmers are very much interlinked with 
agricultural (and cotton) production, 
and resource use (and degradation). We 
can even discern a ‘cotton-environment-
poverty’ nexus, which under certain 
institutional and market circumstances 
can be transformed, leading to a more 
virtuous cycle of income generation. In 
order to analyse livelihood strategies, 
we are using the well-known sustainable 
livelihoods framework as an analytical 
framework (Figure 1), distinguishing 
five forms of capital (or assets), namely 
human, natural, financial, physical, and 
social capital. Together these form the 
foundation of household livelihood 
strategies. Dynamic changes and 
possible alternative crop-mixes which 
small farmers are using are investigated 
in this research. 
To give an example, in the case of 
Xinjiang, human capital is high (with 
near full literacy rates), while for small 
farmers natural capital (land and water 
access), physical capital (irrigation 
systems, machinery etc.), financial 
capital (access to credit, or equity 
capital), and social capital (connections 
with local leadership) is relatively low. 
This leads to the typical spider diagram 
as depicted in Figure 1. Resource 
degradation might also be linked to 
poverty or low income in a two-way 
relation, in which land limitations force 
small farmers to over-exploit their 
resources in order to earn sufficient 
income to overcome poverty, which 
in turn might well become a source of 
further impoverishment due to resultant 
soil degradation 
In a context of vulnerability to 
external shocks (such as climate 
change and fluctuating world market 
prices), seasonality (incomes and 
dependence of available peak labour 
supply), appropriate policies are of 
fundamental importance to support 
positive livelihood outcomes for small 
farm households, in terms of income 
generation and (income) poverty 
reduction. 
In the first year of the research 
project, a large household survey was 
undertaken. It was agreed with the 
XAU that this would be done in Awati 
county (in Aksu Prefecture, see Figure 
2). During several preparatory visits, 
solid institutional and personal contacts 
were established in order to prepare 
the survey. Notably, doing fieldwork 
in China needs much preparation and 
approvals at all administrative levels (i.e. 
central, provincial, prefectural, township 
and administrative village levels of 
government). Utmost care is needed to 
perform the survey as independently 
as possible, preferably with university 
students who are bi-lingual (Chinese-
Uyghur), as many farmers do not 
speak sufficient Chinese. After long 
discussions and a detailed preparation 
of the questionnaire together with a 
team of three scholars from the XAU 
who visited the Netherlands, the 
household survey was completed. 
Particular attention was given to the 
opinions of small farmers on recent 
government policies to diversify into 
more fruit and nut production, and on 
the problems related to land quality, 
and water scarcity and distribution. In 
late November/early December 2008, 
we selected 15 BSc XUA students 
of Uyghur origin to train in survey 
interviewing. The research team 
(with Ma Ying, Zulifeiya Maimaiti and 
Puerhati, all staff members of XUA) 
accompanied these enumerators to 
the field, together with two colleagues 
from Nanjing Agricultural University, 
an affiliated partner in this project. 
One of the Nanjing colleagues was Shi 
Xiaoping, a PhD graduate of ISS and 
whose Alma Mater is the XAU. Max 
Spoor of ISS led the initial training in 
which a draft of the questionnaire was 
practiced, including intensive role-
playing exercises necessary for the 
enumerators and which was started 
during the 20 hour train ride to the 
South. Precise planning was made for a 
household survey of 360 households in 
nine villages (in three townships), based 
on stratified sampling. In the meantime, 
all the necessary approval from the 
village authorities was arranged. Finally, 
the enumerated farm households were 
compensated for their time invested 
(with a standard package with tea, soap, 
cooking oil, etc.). 
Taking into account that a Western 
researcher would draw too much 
official attention, only the Chinese/
One important consequence of China’s 
30-year reform is the emergence of 
NGOs which have enjoyed fast growth 
in recent decades. Before 1978, there 
were only about 6,000 so-called ‘social 
organisations’ in China. By the end 
of 2007, the number of registered 
NGOs had reached 387,000. Moreover, 
the social organisations that existed 
before the reforms were fully controlled 
by the state and served the state’s 
objectives. While some of the registered 
NGOs today are best described 
as government-organised NGOs 
(GONGOs), many were born of private 
initiatives and organised in a bottom-up 
fashion. In addition to the registered 
NGOs, many unregistered grassroots 
organisations have also been very 
active. It is difficult to know their exact 
number, but it is widely believed that 
only a small minority of Chinese NGOs 
are actually registered, so the total 
number runs into several million.    
The development and functioning 
of NGOs in any particular country 
inevitably reflects the overall pattern 
of state-society relations in that 
country. Most developing countries 
do not have a strong state like China’s. 
This immediately makes China stand 
out in terms of the degree of state 
dominance over what might be called 
‘civil society’ (recognising, of course, 
that civil society encompasses a 
broader range of organisational forms 
and activities than represented by 
NGOs). But the civil society that has 
developed in China is also different 
from what one may expect in a typical 
authoritarian state. Kenneth Lieberthal 
has aptly characterised the post-
reform Chinese state as ‘fragmented 
authoritarianism’ (Lieberthal, K. G., 
1992) — while the state has retained 
its dominant role in economic and 
social spheres, authority below the very 
peak of the system has become more 
fragmented and disjointed as a result 
of economic reform and administrative 
decentralisation. The fragmentation of 
state power has created the possibility 
for Chinese NGOs to enjoy a much 
higher degree of de facto autonomy 
than is assumed possible when the state 
is clearly bent on controlling them.  
In this article, autonomy is defined as 
NGOs’ ability to enjoy total operational 
freedom and make independent 
management decisions, including 
deciding what activities to undertake, 
without any government interference. 
Conventional wisdom holds that 
Chinese NGOs lack autonomy: 
one only needs to look at the ‘dual 
management system’ for NGOs to 
realise it, the argument goes. Current 
Chinese government regulations 
require every NGO to place itself 
under the ‘professional management’ 
of a state organ with responsibilities in 
its area of work, in addition to being 
registered and vetted annually by Civil 
Affairs departments. The professional 
management agency holds a wide 
range of responsibilities, including 
supervising the NGO’s ‘ideological 
work’, financial and personnel 
management, research activities, 
contacts with foreign organisations, and 
the reception and use of donations from 
overseas. NGOs that do not comply 
with the dual management requirement 
are outlawed. Therefore, as one Chinese 
researcher summarises the situation: the 
current legal framework ensures that no 
fully autonomous NGO can lawfully exist 
in China (Kang, X., 1999).     
Although the NGO sector as a whole 
lacks autonomy, researchers generally 
assume that at least the ‘popular 
NGOs’ are more autonomous than 
GONGOs. Chinese researchers 
and NGO practitioners often divide 
domestic NGOs into two broad 
categories: GONGOs and ‘popular 
NGOs’. Popular NGOs are initiated 
by private citizens and receive no 
government subsidies. Their staff are 
NGO-State Relations in 
Contemporary China: The Rise of 
Dependent Autonomy
by Lu Yiyi
Uyghur members of the team went to 
a test-village close by to improve and 
finalise the questionnaire. This village 
was not included in the real survey 
(just like the other villages which were 
visited on previous trips of the joint 
research team). During the first week 
of December all the village visits and 
interviews were completed, now only 
by the XUA researchers and students, 
often alone with the farmer or other 
members of the household. As is 
standard survey practice, the collected 
data were checked each night after a 
village was visited. All villages except 
one were nearly exclusively inhabited 
by Uyghurs, while one village (for 
comparative reasons) was included that 
had a majority Han-Chinese population. 
Local cooperation (with the agricultural 
bureau and the village committees) 
was very good and the survey was 
completed as planned. The data is now 
being processed and it is expected that 
some interesting papers will be written 
on the basis of this vast data set.
Max Spoor is associate professor of transition 
economics at the Institute of Social Studies, The 
Hague, and visiting professor at the Barcelona 
Institute for International Studies (IBEI), Spain. He 
can be contacted at spoor@iss.nl
Figure 2: Map of China, Xinjiang 
Province and Aksu Prefecture
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not government employees and they 
do not have officials occupying their top 
management positions.  GONGOs are 
believed to be less autonomous since 
they are launched by the government 
and receive government funding, and 
many of their staff are seconded from 
government agencies or are retired 
officials who still maintain close contact 
with the agencies where they previously 
worked.
Careful empirical research, however, 
has called into question the common 
belief that Chinese NGOs, especially 
GONGOs, suffer from a lack of 
autonomy (Lu, Y., 2007). Through the 
dual management system, the intent of 
the Chinese state is apparently to hold 
the NGO sector on a tight leash, but 
this does not mean that the state always 
effectively enforces its policy. Similarly, 
just because an NGO is launched by a 
government agency with government 
resources does not mean that it will not 
find ways to pursue its own independent 
agenda. There have been many cases 
of GONGOs not only successfully 
evading government supervision but 
also engaging in illegal activities such 
as dodgy profit-making ventures, to 
benefit themselves. The Chinese state 
has failed to stop such activities even 
though they undermine its policies and 
harm its interest.  
There are several reasons why many 
GONGOs have enjoyed extraordinary 
de facto autonomy. First, some officials 
have interfered in the enforcement of 
the government’s NGO regulations on 
behalf of the NGOs they patronise, 
which has led Civil Affairs officials 
in charge of NGO administration to 
lament that in NGO management ‘rule 
of men’ had been more prevalent than 
‘rule of law’. Second, some GONGOs 
are so good at income-generation that 
not only do they not need government 
funding, but they also contribute 
to the coffers of their professional 
management agencies. As a result, they 
are in a strong position to negotiate 
autonomy for themselves. Third, some 
NGOs’ professional management 
agencies may not take their supervisory 
responsibilities seriously and fail to 
monitor the NGOs’ activities. Finally, 
many GONGOs enjoy a special 
relationship with their professional 
management agencies. They were in 
fact created by the very state agencies 
which serve as their supervisory bodies 
and their directors are former or 
incumbent officials in the agencies. 
Consequently, they are often trusted 
and given a free hand rather than tightly 
controlled by the agencies.  
In comparison with GONGOs, 
popular NGOs often have less strong 
bureaucratic connections, lower status 
and inferior knowledge of the way the 
state machinery works. As a result, they 
are actually less able to manipulate 
rules and regulations in order to gain 
autonomy. They are also more afraid 
of defying the authority of government 
agencies. Some big GONGOs with 
powerful patrons have not even shied 
away from direct confrontation with 
central government agencies, such bold 
acts are unthinkable for small grassroots 
NGOs.     
In short, despite the existence of a 
stringent regulatory regime on paper 
which suggests that Chinese NGOs are 
kept in a straitjacket, lacking autonomy 
may not be a big issue for many Chinese 
NGOs in practice. Despite their origin 
and ties to the government, GONGOs 
may actually enjoy more autonomy than 
popular NGOs. This does not mean that 
Chinese NGOs are enjoying unlimited 
freedom from government intervention, 
nor can it be said that GONGOs in 
general are more autonomous than 
popular NGOs. What is clear is that 
the fragmentation of state power 
in the reform era has created much 
manoeuvring space for Chinese NGOs. 
Those organisations that are skilled at 
‘working the system’, whether they are 
GONGOs or popular NGOs, can in fact 
enjoy huge operational freedom.  
The possibility for NGOs to enjoy great 
autonomy tells only half the story of 
NGO-state relations in China. The 
other important feature is the heavy 
dependence of Chinese NGOs on the 
state. Both GONGOs and popular 
NGOs, both the most and the least 
autonomous NGOs, both self-funded 
and state-subsidised NGOs, need to 
draw one form of support or another 
from the state in order to operate. 
Chinese NGOs’ dependence on the 
state can take many different forms. 
Some NGOs can only implement 
their projects in collaboration with the 
government as they lack the human 
and organisational resources to go 
solo. Other NGOs rely on the state for 
essential information, without which 
they cannot carry out their work. Such 
information may be sensitive data not 
released to the public, for example data 
on HIV/AIDS patients needed by health 
NGOs, or highly technical data which 
NGOs are unable to collect themselves, 
such as detailed water and air pollution 
data needed by environmental NGOs. 
Still other NGOs depend on the state 
Participation has been an important 
buzzword in international development 
discourse in recent decades. Despite 
the conventional view that participation 
is not possible within an authoritarian 
political system, participation has 
also been an important buzzword 
within China. People might argue that 
participation in China is very different 
from participation elsewhere in the 
‘South’ and from the meaning implied 
in international development studies. To 
examine this contention, it is important 
to examine the meaning and uses of 
‘participation’ in the Chinese context, 
from political campaigns and activities 
in the Republican era (1920-1949), to 
revolutionary activities in the Maoist era 
(1949-1977), and to various participatory 
practices that have emerged in the 
post-Maoist ‘reform’ period (1978 
to present). From this perspective, 
various modern Chinese concepts of 
participation can be seen to draw from 
European sources while at the same 
time differing in several important 
respects. Nonetheless, examined with 
a discerning eye, the predominantly 
consultative or legitimising use of 
participation in the current Chinese 
context is perhaps not that different 
from current participatory practices 
of western donors in international 
development. In the Chinese context, 
there have been different waves of 
participatory discourse and practice, 
taking the form of ‘campaigns’, 
village committee elections, and 
developmental projects. The history of 
these waves can be traced back to at 
least the 1920s when Yan Yangchu and 
Liang Shuming were inspired by the 
Republican ideals of Sun Yatsen and 
other leading Chinese nationalists and 
began to promote a ‘Mass Education’ 
and ‘Social Laboratory’ approach in 
1920-30. Examples of this were the 
so-called Dingxian Experiment (Rural 
Comparing participation in 
China to the participatory 
discourse in development studies
Lu Caizhen
for protection. NGOs are vulnerable 
to obstruction or predation by corrupt 
government agencies or officials. 
They need protection against such 
hindrances, and the protection can 
only come from the state itself. Without 
a fully established rule of law, NGOs 
need to counter official harassment by 
finding patrons in the government, so 
that when one agency or official makes 
trouble for them, they can turn to other 
agencies or officials to bail them out.         
Since Chinese NGOs can be heavily 
dependent on the state, yet enjoying 
an enormous amount of de facto 
autonomy, their relationship with 
the state is best characterised as 
‘dependent autonomy’ (Lu, Y., 2009). 
‘Dependent’ because, despite the 
decline in the power of the Chinese 
state and its domination over the 
economy and society in the reform era, 
bureaucratic control over the allocation 
of resources and opportunities remains 
extensive. Furthermore, many factors, 
such as the lack of effective checks 
on the predatory and arbitrary use of 
administrative power by state agents, 
an incomplete and ineffective legal 
system and constant fluctuations in 
government policies, have contributed 
to an uncertain environment for NGOs. 
To operate in this environment, NGOs 
need to cultivate official patronage in 
order to gain access to bureaucratically-
allocated resources and political 
protection. 
‘Autonomy’, on the other hand, results 
from the weakening of the Chinese 
state’s social control mechanisms. This, 
in turn, reflects a weakening of the 
state’s ability to control its own agents, 
as NGOs typically rely on the assistance 
of their friends and contacts in the 
government to evade state supervision. 
The increased autonomy of social actors 
in post-reform China has gone hand-
in-hand with the increased autonomy 
of state agencies and officials from the 
central state.  
Insofar as the Chinese model of 
dependent autonomy fits neither the 
strong nor the weak state scenario, 
one may say that it is a unique case. 
However, this does not mean that the 
Chinese case has proved the insights of 
development studies irrelevant. Many 
general conclusions of studies of NGOs 
and civil society development certainly 
hold true for China. For example, too 
much state control stifles civil society 
development. External donor funding 
runs the risk of steering NGOs towards 
programmes that are not suited to 
local needs and conditions. A close 
relationship with the state reduces 
NGOs’ accountability to their grassroots 
constituents. These problems can all be 
observed in China. Therefore, general 
prescriptions for ensuring the healthy 
development and normal functioning 
of civil society, such as the need to 
establish the rule of law, are clearly 
applicable to China.
Lu Yiyi is a Research Fellow at the China Policy 
Institute, University of Nottingham and an Associate 
Fellow at Chatham House (the Royal Institute of 
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 An NGO-facilitated ‘participatory rural appraisal’ in a Tibetan area of Qinghai. / Andrew Fischer
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Reconstruction Movement (RRM) to 
involve education, livelihood, public 
health and self-governance in Dingxian 
County) and the Zouping Experiment 
(RRM in rural basic education and 
community development in Zouping 
County). 
In this regard, it is important to 
recall that the early Republicans saw 
themselves as a revolutionary force; 
they founded the first Chinese nation-
state and fostered an emergent 
pan-Chinese nationalism. So it was in 
this period of nationalist revolutionary 
zeal that many of these programmes 
were innovated.  The experience was 
distinctly Chinese, but at the same time, 
the ideas were definitely influenced 
by many of the liberal and socialist 
revolutionary ideas emerging in Europe 
at the time, particularly given that many 
of these Chinese nationalist elites were 
educated in western-influenced schools. 
For instance, Liang Shuming’s idea of 
local self-governance was to inspire 
independence, the organization of local 
teams, and mass participation; this was 
similar to the ideas of mass political 
mobilisation that fed the participatory 
ideas and practices that emerged in the 
West among many of the socialist and/
or republican movements of the 19th 
and early 20th centuries. 
In the 1920s¸ the rhetoric was ‘from 
the masses, to the masses.’ This 
later became the ‘Mass Line’ of the 
Chinese Communist Party, promoted 
by Chairman Mao Zedong, who viewed 
the world in similar revolutionary 
ways. Moreover, Communist China’s 
‘democratic centralism’ served as 
the foundation for revolutionary 
participation. Decisions were to be 
made by organizations that represented 
‘the majority’, which would then in 
turn be fed to the upper levels of the 
governing hierarchy, up to the Central 
Committee. Trying to bring about 
often radical social changes such as 
land reform, this approach was less 
concerned with the usual participatory 
principle that villagers should be able 
to determine the course of the policies 
that would affect their lives. However, 
such revolutionary participation took 
a very perverse mutation during the 
chaotic years of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976), as participation became 
synonymous with highly politicised 
mass movements motivated by the idea 
that social hierarchies needed to be 
reversed. 
It is doubtful that this Maoist approach 
to revolutionary participation 
influenced the western liberal theories 
of participation, such as those 
promoted by Robert Chambers, which 
currently influence the participatory 
discourses and practices of western 
development agencies. These latter 
liberal participatory approaches arose 
as reactions to the paternalistic aspects 
of the early community development 
approaches of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Similar to the revolutionary or socialist 
approaches, they were premised on 
using a bottom-up perspective to 
community development, implying 
empowerment and a voice for the 
weakest sectors of society in decision-
making. However, they did not imply 
a particular direction or content of 
what such empowerment should 
entail, as this was to be the outcome of 
participatory deliberations. However, 
Maoism definitely influenced socialist 
movements worldwide, particularly 
those in other developing countries, 
notably in Latin America where notions 
of emancipatory participation emerged 
parallel to a rise in actual socialist 
revolutionary challenges to right-wing 
dictatorships throughout the continent. 
In contrast, participatory ideas and 
practice in China’s reform period 
(1979 onwards) has moved away 
from the revolutionary socialist 
origins of Maoism and towards a 
more consultative model rooted in 
authoritarian ‘market socialism’. The 
kinds of participatory approaches 
carried out in the development field 
since the late 1980s have tended to be 
project-based, with most participatory 
projects supported, at least initially, 
by international donors or NGOs. 
During the 1990s, participation in 
development came to be mainly 
understood as the use of Participatory 
Rural Appraisal tools to consult local 
people. Participatory methods were 
applied to appraisal processes as a 
technical accompaniment to economic 
development programmes, a tool in 
the consultation process and a way of 
informing policies. Local people still 
played a limited role in wider decision-
making and policy-formation processes. 
From 1989, village committee elections 
were shaped, initiated and organized 
according to The Organization Law 
of Village Committee of the People’s 
Republic of China, which specified this 
as a task of the Central Government. 
The original initiative sprang from a 
wish to secure stability in the rural areas 
rather than from a concern for villagers’ 
right to influence decisions that affect 
their lives. Thus, participation in China 
has come to be understood as the 
presence of people when decisions 
are announced, the contribution of 
their labour, or their participation 
in schemes for material incentives. 
Generally, it was not optional in the 
past, but is optional now, it can be 
limited to consultation, and might 
involve the use of participatory rural 
appraisal tools, for example. Obviously, 
one might point to forms of what might 
be called ‘autonomous’ participation 
(i.e. participation not organised or 
condoned by the state, and possibly 
in opposition to the state), such as the 
events of Tiananmen in 1989 or the 
Falun Gong movement, but these are 
generally not considered part of the 
ambit of participatory approaches, 
particularly in China. In consequence, 
even with the involvement of 
international donors, participatory 
approaches have tended to steer 
away from notions of mobilisation 
and empowerment and towards more 
technocratic purposes. 
One contention that might be raised 
by these examples is that these 
Chinese ideas of participation do 
not constitute actual participatory 
practices, properly understood, given 
that they are largely consultative in 
nature, or else used for garnering 
legitimacy among the population 
or in the eyes of the international 
community. Recall that according 
to ‘participatory approaches’ in the 
development studies literature (such as 
those articulated by Sherry Arnstein), 
there exists a ladder of participation; 
lower levels of participation include 
passive participation and voluntary 
participation based on consultation or 
monetary incentives, whereas higher, 
more effective levels include interactive 
participation and participation as self-
mobilisation. Hence, the dominant 
forms of participation in China have 
definitely been at the lower level. For 
instance, in the rural reconstruction 
projects of the 1920s and 1930s, 
participation was mainly consultative; 
people expressed their views, made 
suggestions or were consulted. But 
decisions were made by outsiders. 
Similarly, in the Maoist era, participation 
in campaigns mainly took place 
by mobilizing people so that they 
could take part in public meetings 
and officially promoted activities, or 
contribute their labour, often for free. 
Participation after 1978 became a little 
more diversified and the responsiveness 
of government’s top levels possibly 
increased as well, although the 
dominant mode of participation was 
still consultative and often driven by 
material incentives. 
Participatory approaches in China thus 
differ from the ‘ideal type’ imagined 
in development studies. However, 
recalling the critical literature in this 
field, we might recall that the ideals 
of participatory approaches are very 
difficult to find in practice. This is 
particularly the case within contexts 
of stark power asymmetries or where 
larger political and economic processes 
disempower and disenfranchise 
communities at the same time as 
participatory approaches purport to 
empower and enfranchise these same 
communities through de-politicised 
techniques of localised decision-
making. In this sense, perhaps the 
example of China, while obviously 
contravening many of the ‘principles’ 
of participatory development, may not 
be so different from the realities of 
participatory approaches elsewhere in 
the developing world. This is especially 
so in situations where wider political and 
economic decision-making is removed 
from the ambit of these approaches 
as well as the democratic process 
more generally, such as World Bank 
projects implemented within a context 
of stringent structural adjustment 
programmes and further good 
governance conditionalities. In other 
words, the example of China actually 
helps us break free from the idealised 
view implicit within the participatory 
literature and confront more explicitly 
the technocratic and de-politicised 
nature that these approaches have 
evolved towards, both within China and 
elsewhere. 
It cannot be denied that participatory 
approaches in China have strong 
Chinese characteristics and have 
evolved within its own political and 
institutional history, often with few 
reference points to other parts of the 
world. A primary difference in the 
operating context is that participatory 
approaches take place within a 
framework of a top-down and highly 
centralized political system, centred on 
the corpus of the Central Communist 
Party and the national government. Very 
little autonomous participation takes 
a bottom-up form or comes from local 
actors. Only inside the framework of 
top-down leadership can we talk about 
different levels of participation, since 
citizens are not involved in the initiation 
of decisions or even in planning 
activities. Participation is delinked, in 
other words, from policy formation and 
decision making, which remain highly 
centralised. When people contribute 
their labour, express ideas, or are 
consulted, they are considered to be 
participating. However, in this respect, 
we must ask whether this is really that 
different from – say – participation as 
it might operate in most World Bank 
projects?  
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Lu Caizhen (the first from the left) facilitates a focus group discussion on forest management with Mosuo women beside Lugu Lake in Luoshi village, Yunnan Province/  
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